Summary:
This is another in the serious of the Inside the Minds books from Aspatore Books, here attempting to provide perspective from experienced Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Trustees on how to administer consumer bankruptcy cases.
Summary:
Judge Ahart revisits his 2005 article, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, in light of the Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
Households often rely on professionals with specialized knowledge to make important financial decisions. In many cases, the professional’s financial interests are at odds with those of the client. We explore this problem in the context of personal bankruptcy. OLS, fixed effects, and IV estimates all show that attorneys play a central role in determining whether households file under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code.
Abstract:
This Article considers the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, which limited the power of a bankruptcy judge to decide a common law claim. Stern is best understood as a combination of three arguments drawn from the Court’s prior Article III cases. The first is an argument from history — the past division of labor between the Article III judiciary and non-Article III adjudicators. The second is an argument from expertise — the appropriate selection of disputes that benefit from a specialized non-Article III forum.
Abstract:
Congress regularly makes judgment calls of constitutional dimension. One important example of the interaction between the constitutional analysis of the Court and that of Congress involves disputes over the broad grant of jurisdiction exercised by untenured bankruptcy judges. The legislative history preceding the Supreme Court’s decisions in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. and Stern v. Marshall suggest that Congress’s constitutional interpretation is different in kind from that of the Supreme Court.
Abstract:
This paper discusses the possible meaning and effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Stern v. Marshall, in which the Court held that the bankruptcy courts' statutory authority to enter final judgments on certain counterclaims against creditors violates Article III of the Constitution. It was prepared by the authors as a report to the fall 2011 annual meeting of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
The Stern decision is enigmatic.
Starting from the case of Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855), this article looks at the roots of the recent decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). In Murray’s Lessee, the U.S.
This article provides a detailed examination of the structure, sources, and ultimate content of the Islamic law of distressed debt. With specific illustrations from the Qur'an, sunna, and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), it orients non-specialists on the path to understanding where Islamic law comes from, how it is structured, and what its most salient provisions say about the proper treatment of insolvent debtors.
Summary and Commentary:
Starting by painting a vivid tableau of a §341 Meeting of Creditors, its atmosphere is aptly compared with the anxiety of an emergency room. The metaphor gets pushed too far, with the Trustee being likened to a doctor diagnosing people "with a financial emergency- bankruptcy." This would be a fully congruent comparison only if, and I hesitate to extend this metaphor, because most Trustees are truly good and caring people, who keep a debtor’s interest in mind, if not at heart, a medical doctor was charged by his Hippocratic Oath
