Abstract:
Among consumers who file for bankruptcy, African Americans file Chapter 13 petitions at substantially higher rates than other racial groups. Some have hypothesized that the difference is attributable to discrimination by attorneys. We show that the difference may be attributable, in substantial part, to a selection effect: Among distressed consumers, African Americans have longer commutes to work, rely more heavily on cars for the commute, and therefore have greater demand for a bankruptcy process (Chapter 13) that allows them to retain their cars.
Preliminary Comment:
This is a study commissioned by the J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Institute, so not a bunch of wooly-headed, bleeding heart academics. That even it finds tremendous utility in loan modification programs, should not be taken lightly.
Abstract:
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, various mortgage modification programs were introduced to help homeowners struggling to make their monthly mortgage payments remain in their homes.
Abstract:
This Article argues that consistent with the Code’s text and policy, injunctions or other forms of equitable relief should be presumptively treated as “claims,” even if nonbankruptcy law does not permit the enjoined party to satisfy the injunction by the payment of money. This presumption, however, should be rebuttable. No categorical rule can determine when equitable remedies should be monetized and discharged.
Abstract:
Exploiting the within-district random assignment of bankruptcy cases to judges, we provide new evidence on the effects of judges' on-the-bench experience on large public corporate Chapter 11 outcomes. We find that cases assigned to more experienced judges spend less time in bankruptcy, are more likely to be reorganized rather than liquidated, but are not more likely to refile for bankruptcy after emergence.
Abstract:
The propriety and requisites for the settlement of denial of discharge proceedings, initiated under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, has long been a subject of controversy in the federal judiciary. One series of decisions prohibits any settlement that would include the debtor’s payment of settlement funds or giving other value. At the other end of the spectrum, various courts have approved such settlements, even permitting direct payment to the prosecuting creditor under appropriate circumstances.
Abstract:
How did mortgage risk pricing for securitized loans change during the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis? Using a database from a major American bank that serves as trustee for private-label securitized loans, this paper shows that the decline in underwriting standards was accompanied by a decline in credit spreads on mortgages, after adjusting for loan/borrower characteristics. Observable information, including FICO and LTV, became less influential on mortgage risk pricing over time during the housing bubble.
