Summary: Mr. Hurlburt sought to cram down the claim of a seller-financed purchase money deed to the value of his principal residence. While this would have been impermissible under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), because the note was due, Mr. Hurlburt argued that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) allowed such treatment even though Witt v. United Companies Lending Corp., 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997) interpreted that section to allow only modification of the payment and not cram down. As this was a seller-financed purchase money deed, the anti-deficiency provisions of N.C.G.S.

Summary: Federal Insurance Company, together with other plaintiffs, sought to amend its complaint, which already asserted that the debt owed by Mr. Sorge was nondischargable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), to add a claim of embezzlement and to revive a previously dismissed claim of breach of fiduciary duty, both nondischargable under § 523(a)(4). As “[l]eave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, but may be denied if undue prejudice would result or if the amendment is futile,” Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir.

Summary: Throughout extended litigation regarding the validity of a junior mortgage (there are more than 300 docket entries in this Chapter 13 case), a motion to dismiss filed by the trustee remained pending due to the inability to confirm a plan.

Summary: Ms. Roger inherited real property from her mother, which included a residence and a building originally used as a country store, which was subsequently renovated into a residential rental property. After obtaining a mortgage against the entire property, Ms. Rogers, with the consent of the lienholder, subdivided the residence and the rental properties. Upon filing Chapter 13, Ms.

Summary: During a period of financial distress and shortly before their divorce, Doreen Baum made repeated unauthorized withdrawals from the Martin Baum’s IRAs, and did not pay the mortgage on the couple’s beach house, using the funds for the support and maintenance of the family. When the Baums divorced, the parties entered into an consent orders for Alimony and Equitable Distribution.

Summary: Turnover of a vehicle held by a Raeford Collision and subject to a possessory mechanic’s lien was resolved subject to a Consent Order, which required the MacGregor to provide the title to the vehicle so that a lien could be recorded with the North Carolina DMV.

Summary: Mr. Faison filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy seeking, among other things, to continue to develop real property against which Summit Bridge held several claims. Summit Bridge objected to confirmation of Mr. Faison’s (third) plan of reorganization based on infeasibility at it was a “visionary scheme” that was “based on speculation, hope and desire, and has no demonstrable objective fact or facts as its foundation.” While stating that it believed Mr. Faison could ultimately propose a feasible plan, the bankruptcy court found the current plan infeasible.

Summary: While Ms. Sparrow’s civil action for equitable distribution was pending in state court, she file a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The primary assets of her bankruptcy estate consist of a fee simple interest in a house and lot located in Durham, North Carolina and a one-half undivided tenant-in-common interest in five tracts of real property located in Granville County, North Carolina, the stated intention being that the plan would liquidate these assets and pay creditors, potentially in full. Ms. Sparrow first commenced an Adversary Proceeding against Mr.

Summary: Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107. The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.

Summary: This case involved a valuation duel between Ms. Sweeney and Ditech over a 1999 Horton Mirage II 24' x 52' mobile home, which all parties agreed was personal property. At the valuation hearing. Ms. Sweeney testified both as to her belief that the property suffered from “extensive water damage” and general disrepair, having a value of $10,000-$11,000. Ms. Sweeney based this on the county tax value of $9,850. Ditech presented Mr.