Summary: Debtor executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust in favor of First Citizens in 2004, but since the loans inception made payments to (or through) Cenlar.  After the Debtor filed Chapter 13 in 2007,    Cenlar filed a proof of claim, including a copy of the note, but without any indorsement.  In 2008, the Debtor fell behind on payments and a consent order resolving such delinquency was entered, stating, among other things, that Cellar was the holder or servicer of the note.  In March of 2011, Residential Credit Solutions ("RCS") filed a

Summary: The complaint and anser both failed, in contravention of Rules 7008(a) and 7012(b), to state whether the proceeding was core or  non-core, and if non-core, where the parties consented to the bankruptcy court entering  final orders or judgments.  The Court held that, in light of Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct.

Summary: A few hours prior to a foreclosure sale, 15 parcels of real property were transferred to the Debtors by three corporations owed by the Debtors.  The Debtors shortly thereafter filed Chapter 11.  BB&T commenced an Adversary Proceeding seeking to avoid the transfers as fraudulent conveyances and because some were made ultra vires and brought a Motion for Summary Judgment. In determining whether a transfer was a fraudulent conveyance the court first turned to the non-exclusive list of factors found in N.C. Gen. Stat.

Summary: A commercial guarantee and Deed of Trust in the amount of $250,000.00 was executed by Prudential Investors, L.L.C., of which the Male Debtor was 50% owner.  The commercial guarantee defined the "guarantor" as the Male Debtor, but the Female Debtor also signed under the word "Guarantor."  At the same time, the Male Debtor also signed two $100,000.00 notes that included the words "personal guaranty" under the signature line on an addenda to the notes. The Male Debtor alleged that he had, in fact, forged his wife’s name to the commercial guarantee.  The

Summary: Following a foreclosure, appeal of the foreclosure to the North Carolin Court of Appeals (which was dismissed for failure by the homeowner to comply with deadlines), an unconsummated foreclosure bid by the homeowner's daughter, and two civil suits in state court, the Debtor eventually filed Chapter 13 (twice).  Not surprisingly, Wells Fargo had lost patience with the Debtor and sought not only relief from the automatic stay as to the Debtor, but also in rem relief against the real property itself under 11 U.S.C.

Summary: The Debtor was a personal guarantor of 10 contracts between John Deere and his corporation, PEP, for the purchase of construction equipment.   Prior to filing bankruptcy, the Debtor sold 5 of the pieces of equipment to third parties, without the consent of John Deere. John Deere then instituted an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) to except from discharge this debt, asserting that it arose from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."  Following In re Buck, 406 B.R. 703 (Bankr.

Canovali-Relief from Chapter 11 Confirmation Order under Rule 60(b)Summary:  The Debtors had a two mortgage against their home, initially valued in the amount of $1,068,000.00,  with Bank of America, a first with a balance of $988,000.00 and second with a balance of $368,000.00. The Debtors proposed a Chapter 11 plan that recognized that there were two notes and Deeds of Trust, but that both such claims would be paid as a s

Summary: The Debtor filed Chapter 13, during which Friedman’s Jewelers filed a Proof of Claim, asserting that it was secured in the amount of $300.00 and unsecured for the balance.  The Debtor subsequently converted to Chapter 7, then re-converted to Chapter 13, eventually confirming a plan treating Friedman’s as secured in the amount of $300.00. Friedman’s itself filed bankruptcy and its assets were liquidated, with the Debtor’s account being purchased by Merchant’s Acquisition Group, L.L.C.  (MAG).  MAG retained BRM Recovery Services to collect on this accou

The bankruptcy court held that despite the excision in BAPCPA of "substantial" from the abuse provision of 707(b)(3), that the factors laid out by the 4th Circuit in Green v. Staples, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991) were still good law.