Summary:
In this case, the bankruptcy court’s retelling of the facts (or allegations of facts) surrounding a failed friendship, a failed car wash and the ownership of a 1968 Ford Mustang could serve as a prospectus for a reality television show.
The issue ultimately revolved around the validity of a replacement title obtained by Morgan from the DMV. The court held that the burden fell on Morgan to establish that the subsequent Title Application was valid.
Summary:
Previously, the bankruptcy court granted the Debtor’s Motion to Employ Jones and DJP (the “Special Counsel Motion”) for the “limited purposes” of representing the Debtor “with respect to such corporate and securities matters as may be requested.” The Special Counsel Motion disclosed the fact that DJP was prepetition counsel to the Debtor and was owed a prepetition debt, but did not state the amount owed, which was in excess of $500,000.
Summary:
On remand from the district court, the issue was whether the complaint filed by Livingstone College, Inc. (“Livingstone”) properly states a claim for relief under 11 U.S.C.
Summary:
Under the test formulated by the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall the court may enter final judgment in a core proceeding where "the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would
necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process." Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618. Where a defendant has filed a proof of claim, a fraudulent transfer action brought under either section 548 or
section 544 becomes a part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims. See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S.
Summary:
The Debtor was a North Carolina corporation, wholly owned by DeCoro Limited (“Ltd.”), a Hong Kong limited liability company, which shipped furniture manufactured in China to the United States. The the furniture sales in the United States were procured by the Debtor. In 2008 or 2009, the IRS began an examination to determine whether the Debtor or Ltd. were liable for taxes in the United States. The determination hinged on whether the Debtor was a “dependent agent” of Ltd., in which case Ltd.
Summary:
The Debtor was a North Carolina corporation, wholly owned by DeCoro Limited (“Ltd.”), a Hong Kong limited liability company, which shipped furniture manufactured in China to the United States. The the furniture sales in the United States were procured by the Debtor. In 2008 or 2009, the IRS began an examination to determine whether the Debtor or Ltd. were liable for taxes in the United States. The determination hinged on whether the Debtor was a “dependent agent” of Ltd., in which case Ltd.
Summary:
Decor sought to rejoin Decofin, L.L.C. as a party, after it had been voluntarily dismissed by DeCoro earlier, and to add additional claims to its Complaint based upon alleged fraud and breach of a settlement agreement by the Defendant ("Ricci") and Decofin that occurred subsequent to the commencement of this adversary proceeding.
Summary:
Sixteen months after filing Chapter 13, the Debtor converted to Chapter 7. Capital One, the lienholder against the Debtor’s vehicle, sent the Debtor a reaffirmation agreement, which would have required immediate and full payment of the $16,149.46 balance. Debtor’s counsel requested Capital One negotiate payment terms, but received no response. No reaffirmation on the original contract terms was offered.
Summary:
Trustee sought leave to amend a Complaint, which originally alleged fraudulent conveyances under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 548 and N.C.G.S. § 39.23.4 and unjust enrichment, to add a claim for preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547. The Defendants, having already answered the Complaint, objected.
Leave to amend should be denied, therefore, “only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile.” Edwards v.
