Summary: Reserve Homeowners Association commenced a foreclosure against residential rental property owned by Ms. Ackah for unpaid homeowner’s association dues. Notice of the sale was left at the property and notices sent (and returned unclaimed) to other family members. Ultimately, the property was purchased by the Jones Family Holdings a the sale. Finding that Ms. Ackah did not receive actual notice of the foreclosure , the superior court accordingly set aside the sale. The majority of opinion of the Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S.

Summary: After the death of her Melvin Clayton, Wells Fargo accelerated the reverse mortgage note and sought to foreclose on the residence still owned by Mrs. Clayton. The Court of Appeals held that even though Mrs. Clayton was identified as a “borrower” on the Deed of Trust, Melvin Clayton was “the only contemplated borrower to the reverse-mortgage agreement, as he alone executed [those] documents and was obligated under them.” Mrs. Clayton was, due to her age, ineligible to be a borrower under the reverse mortgage, which, pursuant to N.C.G.S.

Summary: In an unfulfilled business agreement, over a period of fourteen (14) years, Medflow, Inc. never made any royalty payments, never provided a written sales reports ,and never obtained consent for restricted sales. When Christenbury Eye Center, P.A. brought suit for such, the trial court dismissed the case as the various claims were stale under the applicable Statutes of Limitations.

Summary: In previously ruling on the foreclosure by power of sale on this property, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld that foreclosure, finding that the Deed of Trust contained a sufficient description to identify the real property. See In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Reed, 233 N.C. App. 598, 758 S.E.2d 902, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 381 (2014). Subsequently, but before the foreclosure sale was completed, Mr. Howse and Ms. Reed brought a separate suit in Superior Court, raising equitable grounds to enjoin the foreclosure.

Summary: Melvin Clayton obtained a reverse mortgage, granting a Deed of Trust against his home. His wife, Jackie, was ineligible for the reverse mortgage (presumably because she was not old enough), so did not sign the note, but did sign the Deed of Trust. The note included a provision that accelerated the debt upon his death, unless a “surviving borrower” continued to reside in the home. Upon Melvin Clayton’s death, Wells Fargo sought to foreclose. The Court of Appeals held that as N.C.G.S.

Summary: As part of its Chapter 11 reorganization Bally Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic assumed a lease with Friday Investment, which had originally included a guaranty by Bally Holding. When Bally Mid-Atlantic later defaulted, Friday Investments sought to enforce the guaranty against Bally Holding. Bally asserted that while the lease had been assumed, the guaranty was discharged. In a divided opinion, the majority of held that under North Carolina law a guaranty is a separate contract from the underlying obligation, Tripps Rests. of N.C., Inc. v.

Summary: Mr. Weiss, together with his business partner, purchased land for development in Charlotte by obtaining a $28,290,000 loan from GECMC 2006-C1 Carrington Oaks, LLC (“Carrington Oaks”) conditioned, in part, on their personal guaranties. After the loan defaulted, Carrington Oaks brought suit for payment against Mr. Weiss. At trial, however, Mr.

Summary: The IRS recorded two tax liens against real property and subsequently the Village of Sugar Mountain (“the Village”) obtain a third lien against the property for local property taxes. The Village ultimately sought to foreclose on its tax lien, but did not, despite the requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a), give notice to the federal government of the sale. The property was sold on November 13, 2013, in a judicial tax foreclosure for $6,673.73 to the Village. The following day, November, 14, 2013,the property was sold at a federal tax foreclosure to Mr.

Summary: Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107. The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.

  Summary: While factually complicated, this case presents two issues of first impression under North Carolina law, first regarding the interpretation of the term “transfer” the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, N.C.G.S.