Summary: Mr. Smith filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy after Wells Fargo commenced foreclosure on real property. The amended proposed plan provided for the cram-down of the secured claim held by Wells Fargo to $60,000.00. The Confirmation Order provided “that confirmation is expressly conditioned upon [Mr. Smith] providing for the payment of all claims assertable against [Mr. Smith’s] estate as specified in the Plan and in this Order.” The Chapter 11 case was, however, dismissed at Mr. Smith’s request two years later, after which Wells Fargo recommenced foreclosure.

Summary: In a long-running case, of which this is the fourth opinion from the court, the Debtor and Bankruptcy administrator objected to the attorney’s fees sought by Bate Land Company (“BLC”). The Court held that BLC was an over secured creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). The Debtor, however, first contended that the Note provided for attorney’s fees to BLC only in the event of a default and that, since the bankruptcy was filed during the 10-day grace period after the initial missed payment, there had been not default.

Summary: Uncontested evidence showed that the Debtor had failed to disclose the transfer of real property to her brother 15 days prior to the filing of her bankruptcy as well as the omission of ownership interests in an investment club and several bank accounts. While it was determined in a separate action that the transfer of the real property was subject to a pre-existing lien and had no equity, the Bankruptcy Administrator nonetheless sought denial of the Debtor’s discharge under both 11 U.S.C.

Summary: The Debtors sought to strip-off the lien held by PSNC Energy for a HVAC unit as wholly unsecured based on the value of the real property. Without any answer by PSNC, the Court sua sponte held that based on the record, consisting primarily of the Proof of Claim filed by PSNC, that A UCC-1 fixture filing had been recorded within 20 days of installation of the HVAC unit and was, pursuant to N.C.G.S.

Summary: The Court held that Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 191 L.E. 2d 783 (2015) did not prevent a Chapter 13 trustee from paying administrative expenses funds held by the following conversion of the case to Chapter 7 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) and Bankruptcy Rule of Federal Procedure Rule 1019. Commentary: Attached to the application for fees was an affidavit from the debtor stating that she understood that the funds on hand could be returned to her but that she nonetheless wanted those funds sent to the her attorney.

Summary: In order to provide for attorney's fees and allow for filing of a Chapter 7, Mr. Pace's attorney took a voluntary lien against Mr.

Summary: Ms. Novara deposited a check from her mother for $10,000 into her child's custodial account twenty-seven (27) days prior to filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Trustee sought to set this aside as a fraudulent conveyance and sought summary judgment. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment premised on a fraudulent transfer, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

Summary: Mr. Ennis filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, including First Federal as a creditor. While First Federal did activate a bankruptcy block to discontinue past due notifications, its continued to send computer generated monthly statements to Mr. Ennis, listing the balance, accrued interest and amount past due. Mr. Ennis’ counsel did send notices to First Federal regarding the bankruptcy filing and the extent of the automatic stay, but did not describe any specific wrong doing. These notices were sent to First Federal at its street address, rather than its mailing address.

Summary: Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan was confirmed cramming down the claim of Greater Piedmont Credit Union against mobile home and land, prior to the filing of the Proof of Claim by GPCU showing that title to the mobile home had been cancelled, affixing it to the real property.

Summary: After the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Mr. Nevils received a lump-sum Worker’s Compensation award of $235,000. Over the Trustee’s objection, the bankruptcy court previously allowed Mr. Nevils’ exemption of the proceeds, without ruling at that time on whether such constituted disposable income. The Trustee, supported by the Bankruptcy Administrator, then brought a motion to modify, arguing that even though exempt, the award constituted a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances and should be considered in calculating Mr.