Summary:
In previously ruling on the foreclosure by power of sale on this property, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld that foreclosure, finding that the Deed of Trust contained a sufficient description to identify the real property. See In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Reed, 233 N.C. App. 598, 758 S.E.2d 902, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 381 (2014). Subsequently, but before the foreclosure sale was completed, Mr. Howse and Ms. Reed brought a separate suit in Superior Court, raising equitable grounds to enjoin the foreclosure.
NC Court of Appeals
By Ed Boltz, 3 August, 2017
Summary:
Melvin Clayton obtained a reverse mortgage, granting a Deed of Trust against his home. His wife, Jackie, was ineligible for the reverse mortgage (presumably because she was not old enough), so did not sign the note, but did sign the Deed of Trust. The note included a provision that accelerated the debt upon his death, unless a “surviving borrower” continued to reside in the home. Upon Melvin Clayton’s death, Wells Fargo sought to foreclose.
The Court of Appeals held that as N.C.G.S.
By Ed Boltz, 3 August, 2017
Summary:
As part of its Chapter 11 reorganization Bally Total Fitness of the Mid-Atlantic assumed a lease with Friday Investment, which had originally included a guaranty by Bally Holding. When Bally Mid-Atlantic later defaulted, Friday Investments sought to enforce the guaranty against Bally Holding. Bally asserted that while the lease had been assumed, the guaranty was discharged.
In a divided opinion, the majority of held that under North Carolina law a guaranty is a separate contract from the underlying obligation, Tripps Rests. of N.C., Inc. v.
By Ed Boltz, 2 August, 2017
Summary:
Mr. Weiss, together with his business partner, purchased land for development in Charlotte by obtaining a $28,290,000 loan from GECMC 2006-C1 Carrington Oaks, LLC (“Carrington Oaks”) conditioned, in part, on their personal guaranties. After the loan defaulted, Carrington Oaks brought suit for payment against Mr. Weiss.
At trial, however, Mr.
By Ed Boltz, 20 December, 2016
Summary:
The IRS recorded two tax liens against real property and subsequently the Village of Sugar Mountain (“the Village”) obtain a third lien against the property for local property taxes. The Village ultimately sought to foreclose on its tax lien, but did not, despite the requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a), give notice to the federal government of the sale. The property was sold on November 13, 2013, in a judicial tax foreclosure for $6,673.73 to the Village. The following day, November, 14, 2013,the property was sold at a federal tax foreclosure to Mr.
By Ed Boltz, 13 December, 2016
Summary:
Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107.
The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.
By Ed Boltz, 11 December, 2016
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Summary:
While factually complicated, this case presents two issues of first impression under North Carolina law, first regarding the interpretation of the term “transfer” the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, N.C.G.S.
By Ed Boltz, 8 September, 2016
Summary:
In 2004, PRMC, through its president and sole shareholder, Zulfiquar M. Khan, borrowed $1,950,000 from Business Loan Center, L.L.C. (“BLC”), with the note including an “Unconditional Guarantee” from Mr. Khan and a Deed of Trust against a hotel and all personal property. In September 2007, Mr. Khan, PRMC and BLC agreed to a four month reduced payment on the note, with the allonge including a release (in bold and all capitals) by both parties of all claims against each other. This same language was again included in a July 2008 payment deferral agreement.
By Ed Boltz, 29 July, 2016
Summary:
Ms. Cain granted a Deed of Trust against her home securing a mortgage note to Household Realty Corporation (“HRC”), which was first specially endorsed to Household Bank, but HRC later specially endorsed the not to Beal Bank, which, following Cain’s default, appointed Rogers, Townsend & Thomas (“RTT”) as substitute trustee to commence foreclosure. After the Cumberland County Clerk of Court allowed the foreclosure sale to proceed, Cain appealed to Superior Court and sent a Request for Admissions to RTT.
By Ed Boltz, 13 May, 2016
Summary:
The Pinkneys executed a mortgage note (“the Note”) in favor of Ford Consumer Finance, secured by a Deed of Trust. The Note was later indorsed to Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization (“CBASS”), which, in turn, assigned the Note to U.S. Bank, as Indenture Trustee, and lastly to U.S. Bank, without recourse.
When U.S. Bank later sought to foreclose and a judgment for money owed, the Pinkney moved to dismiss that action on the basis that U.S.