Summary:
Mr. Weiss, together with his business partner, purchased land for development in Charlotte by obtaining a $28,290,000 loan from GECMC 2006-C1 Carrington Oaks, LLC (“Carrington Oaks”) conditioned, in part, on their personal guaranties. After the loan defaulted, Carrington Oaks brought suit for payment against Mr. Weiss.
At trial, however, Mr.
By Ed Boltz, 20 December, 2016
Summary:
The IRS recorded two tax liens against real property and subsequently the Village of Sugar Mountain (“the Village”) obtain a third lien against the property for local property taxes. The Village ultimately sought to foreclose on its tax lien, but did not, despite the requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a), give notice to the federal government of the sale. The property was sold on November 13, 2013, in a judicial tax foreclosure for $6,673.73 to the Village. The following day, November, 14, 2013,the property was sold at a federal tax foreclosure to Mr.
By Ed Boltz, 13 December, 2016
Summary:
Following the disclosure in more than 4,200 Proofs of Claim by Wake Med of personal identifying information, several Debtors sought sanctions for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9037, HIPAA, and 11 U.S.C. §107.
The bankruptcy court held that it was not a “HIPAA compliance tribunal” and might not have jurisdiction to decide such claims. Further, “[t]he case law overwhelmingly holds that there is no private right of action under HIPAA or §107 ”, leaving Rule 9037 as the primary remedy.
By Ed Boltz, 11 December, 2016
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Summary:
While factually complicated, this case presents two issues of first impression under North Carolina law, first regarding the interpretation of the term “transfer” the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, N.C.G.S.
By Ed Boltz, 8 September, 2016
Summary:
In 2004, PRMC, through its president and sole shareholder, Zulfiquar M. Khan, borrowed $1,950,000 from Business Loan Center, L.L.C. (“BLC”), with the note including an “Unconditional Guarantee” from Mr. Khan and a Deed of Trust against a hotel and all personal property. In September 2007, Mr. Khan, PRMC and BLC agreed to a four month reduced payment on the note, with the allonge including a release (in bold and all capitals) by both parties of all claims against each other. This same language was again included in a July 2008 payment deferral agreement.
By Ed Boltz, 29 July, 2016
Summary:
Ms. Cain granted a Deed of Trust against her home securing a mortgage note to Household Realty Corporation (“HRC”), which was first specially endorsed to Household Bank, but HRC later specially endorsed the not to Beal Bank, which, following Cain’s default, appointed Rogers, Townsend & Thomas (“RTT”) as substitute trustee to commence foreclosure. After the Cumberland County Clerk of Court allowed the foreclosure sale to proceed, Cain appealed to Superior Court and sent a Request for Admissions to RTT.
By Ed Boltz, 13 May, 2016
Summary:
The Pinkneys executed a mortgage note (“the Note”) in favor of Ford Consumer Finance, secured by a Deed of Trust. The Note was later indorsed to Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization (“CBASS”), which, in turn, assigned the Note to U.S. Bank, as Indenture Trustee, and lastly to U.S. Bank, without recourse.
When U.S. Bank later sought to foreclose and a judgment for money owed, the Pinkney moved to dismiss that action on the basis that U.S.
By Ed Boltz, 12 May, 2016
Summary:
Mr. Smith filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy after Wells Fargo commenced foreclosure on real property. The amended proposed plan provided for the cram-down of the secured claim held by Wells Fargo to $60,000.00. The Confirmation Order provided “that confirmation is expressly conditioned upon [Mr. Smith] providing for the payment of all claims assertable against [Mr. Smith’s] estate as specified in the Plan and in this Order.” The Chapter 11 case was, however, dismissed at Mr. Smith’s request two years later, after which Wells Fargo recommenced foreclosure.
By Ed Boltz, 1 December, 2015
Summary:
In a dispute between construction contractors, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court order denying a demand for arbitration as untimely. Holding normally a trial court should determine the validity of an arbitration agreement (namely that a valid agreement exists and that the dispute is within the scope of the agreement), here the trial court instead found that even assuming arguendo that there was an enforceable arbitration provision, the demand was untimely.
By Ed Boltz, 5 February, 2015
Summary:
The Bobers sought to raise issues with the validity of the notarization of a Deed of Trust against property owned as tenants by the entireties on the basis that Mr. Bober had signed it for himself and under a Power of Attorney for his wife, but the notary did not expressly indicate that he was appearing in that capacity for Mrs.