Abstract:
Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows an individual debtor and his or her "spouse" to commence a joint bankruptcy case by filing a single bankruptcy petition. The term spouse is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code; however, since 1996, section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") has defined a spouse for purposes of federal law as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Although no state permitted same-sex couples to marry when DOMA was adopted in 1996, six states currently permit same-sex couples to marry.
Summary:
National Heritage Foundation, Inc. ("NHF") filed a Chapter 11 reorganization including provisions in its plan that prevented claim not only against NHF, but also its officers, directors and employees (among others), for acts or omissions arising prior to the reorganization. The bankruptcy court affirmed these release provisions, finding that these release provisions were "essential" to the reorganization.
On appeal, Berhman contended that the plan was not proposed in good faith and was "a sham perpetrated by NHF’s officers and directors to secure immunit
Summary:
The Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2008. Following a Motion to convert or dismiss the case filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee, the Debtors voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. The U.S. Trustee sought dismissal of the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
Summary:
Debtor executed a promissory note and Deed of Trust in favor of First Citizens in 2004, but since the loans inception made payments to (or through) Cenlar. After the Debtor filed Chapter 13 in 2007, Cenlar filed a proof of claim, including a copy of the note, but without any indorsement. In 2008, the Debtor fell behind on payments and a consent order resolving such delinquency was entered, stating, among other things, that Cellar was the holder or servicer of the note. In March of 2011, Residential Credit Solutions ("RCS") filed a
Summary:
A few hours prior to a foreclosure sale, 15 parcels of real property were transferred to the Debtors by three corporations owed by the Debtors. The Debtors shortly thereafter filed Chapter 11. BB&T commenced an Adversary Proceeding seeking to avoid the transfers as fraudulent conveyances and because some were made ultra vires and brought a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In determining whether a transfer was a fraudulent conveyance the court first turned to the non-exclusive list of factors found in N.C. Gen. Stat.
Summary:
A commercial guarantee and Deed of Trust in the amount of $250,000.00 was executed by Prudential Investors, L.L.C., of which the Male Debtor was 50% owner. The commercial guarantee defined the "guarantor" as the Male Debtor, but the Female Debtor also signed under the word "Guarantor." At the same time, the Male Debtor also signed two $100,000.00 notes that included the words "personal guaranty" under the signature line on an addenda to the notes.
The Male Debtor alleged that he had, in fact, forged his wife’s name to the commercial guarantee. The
Summary:
Following a foreclosure, appeal of the foreclosure to the North Carolin Court of Appeals (which was dismissed for failure by the homeowner to comply with deadlines), an unconsummated foreclosure bid by the homeowner's daughter, and two civil suits in state court, the Debtor eventually filed Chapter 13 (twice). Not surprisingly, Wells Fargo had lost patience with the Debtor and sought not only relief from the automatic stay as to the Debtor, but also in rem relief against the real property itself under 11 U.S.C.
Following an order denying the Debtor’s motion to dismiss, the Debtor sought certification of his appeal directly to the Court of Appeals, bypassing the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B). Direct certification is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) if the court before which the matter is pending determines:
(i) the . . . order . . . involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling decision of
Summary:
The Debtor sought to employ James McElroy & Diehl, P.A. ("JMD"), as counsel under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) for representation in various other matters, including litigation and other "future, discrete matters" in the bankruptcy cases. Because JMD had received substantial compensation from two equity owners of the Debtor, who were also substantial creditors, the Court found that JMD could not be deemed to be disinterested as required under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) and could not be approved. Nor could JMD be approved under 11 U.S.C.
Summary:
The Court examined the three options for determining household size for Means Test calculations. Rejecting both the Census Bureau "heads on beds" approach and the IRS dependency test, the Court instead found that an analysis of "economic unit" was appropriate.
"Head on Beds" could be inaccurate "[i]f the debtor’s household includes an individual who purchases these items from his own separate income, and contributes nothing to the debtor’s household for these items, then the deduction will include an unwarranted extra amount that wouldotherwise be