Abstract: How did mortgage risk pricing for securitized loans change during the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis? Using a database from a major American bank that serves as trustee for private-label securitized loans, this paper shows that the decline in underwriting standards was accompanied by a decline in credit spreads on mortgages, after adjusting for loan/borrower characteristics. Observable information, including FICO and LTV, became less influential on mortgage risk pricing over time during the housing bubble.

Summary: After direct appeal to the 4th Circuit was declined, the district court affirmed the opinion of the bankruptcy court in Hurlburt that the anti-deficiency statute of N.C.G.S. § 45-21.28 does not allow debtors to circumvent the anti-modification provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) and (c)(2), with Witt v. United Companies Lending Corp. (In Re Witt), 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir.

Summary: Between March 7, 2017, and November 28, 2017, Mr. Stockwell filed first a Chapter 13 and then three Chapter 7 cases, with the fourth case being filed while the third was still pending. (The dismissal of the third case had been set aside as it had been automatically dismissed due to the failure to file documents under 11 U.S.C. § 521(I) while the Bankruptcy Administrator’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.) Mr. Stockwell’s cases were filed with the apparent intent of holding off a foreclosure by Ocwen, as it was the only creditor listed in any of his cases.

Summary: In a Chapter 11 case, Summitbridge held a secured (but under secured) claim, which was satisfied, pursuant to the confirmation order, by tender of the collateral. Summitbridge then filed an additional unsecured, nonpriority claim for it attorneys fees, pursuant to its promissory note, in the amount of 15% of the outstanding indebtness, totaling more than $300,000.

Summary: In their Chapter 7, the Youngs agreed, in a court approved settlement,  to allow the sale of their residence, splitting the net proceeds  equally with the Trustee and were to keep “only those furnishings necessary to furnish their new residence”, with the remainder of their personal property  to be auctioned.  After initially identifying the property they were to retain with the Trustee’s auctioneer, the Young sold all of their additional property with a different auction company, using the funds to pay for moving costs.  It appears that the

Abstract: In 1978, Congress made it illegal for government employers to deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against a person who has filed bankruptcy. In 1984, Congress extended this prohibition to private employers by making it illegal for such employers to terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against a person who has filed bankruptcy.

Summary: Ms. Redding’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed providing that she was to have six months in which to market and sell her principal residence and was required to make adequate protection payments on the mortgage claim of $1,000.00 per month during that time. After failing to do either, Ms.

Summary: The Bankruptcy Administrator sought dismissal of Mrs. Gonyo’s Chapter 7 arguing that she improperly excluded several of her non-filing husband’s expenses as “marital adjustments” from her Current Monthly and also failed to include both the couple’s tax refund and her husband’s incentive pay in that calculation. In reaching the later conclusion, the bankruptcy court defined “income” as “a gain or recurrent benefit . . . that derives from capital or labor.” In re Sanchez, No. 06-40865, 2006 WL 2038616, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.

Summary: The Ohnmachts, having completed their Chapter 11 plan and received a discharge, sent a demand letter to Commercial Credit Group demanding that the judgment against them be cancelled. When CCG declined, they re-opened their bankruptcy and brought an adversary proceeding asserting breach of contract, violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-239 and § 75-1.1 et seq, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and seeking relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (“FDJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

Summary: Mr. Barth commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that various state court actions by Mr. Spoor could have been brought by the bankruptcy trustee, who had previously signed a release of such actions, and that Mr. Spoor should be required to dismiss those actions. The bankruptcy court instead dismissed Mr. Barth’s adversary proceeding on the grounds that such relief was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The bankruptcy court declined, however, to award the sanctions sought by Mr.