Summary:
Through requests submitted to the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) under the state Freedom of Information Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10 to -165 (FOIA), Michael E. Spears, Esq., Gedney M. Howe, III, Esq., Richard A. Harpootlian, Esq., and A. Camden Lewis, Esq.
Summary:
The Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan proposed the surrender of an ATV, but she nonetheless took a deduction, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), for the payments due on this secured obligation. Finding that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010), allows a bankruptcy court to “ account for changes in the debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation." Id. at 2478 (Emphasis added), the 4th Circuit disallowed the deduction from the Debtor’s “projected disposable income” under 11 U.S.C.
Summary:
Following foreclosure and bankruptcy, the Debtors raised claims against Bayview under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The statute of limitations provides that:
With respect to violations arising from other consumer credit sales or consumer loans, no action pursuant to this subsection may be brought more than one year after the due date of the last scheduled payment of the agreement. W. Va.
Sun Trust sued to collect on deficiencies following a foreclosure in North Carolina. The Debtors raised defenses challenging the validity of the debt and the default. The Court of Appeals held that the determination of a valid debt and default at the foreclosure hearing was res judicata. While the Debtors could not have raised these equitable defenses in the hearing under N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16, they could have raised such defenses in a proceeding to enjoin the foreclosure under N.C.G.S.
Debtor was the beneficiary of two Spendthrift Trusts. The Spendthrift Trusts, which were governed by Pennsylvania law, protected both the income and corpus/principal of the trusts for the beneficiaries. As such, 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title" and the trusts were outside the reach of the bankruptcy estate.
The Debtors executed an adjustable rate mortgage note on May 5, 2006, and received several disclosures, including a Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement, a Notice of Right to Cancel, a Variable Rate Mortgage Program Disclosure, a HUD-1 Settlement Statement and a First Payment Letter.
Summary:
Rudlow, the attorney for WFS, brought a replevin action against Rawlinson and her nephew, for a vehicle which the nephew owned, subject to a lien held by WFS. Rawlinson was not a party to the note, but Rudlow believed Rawlinson either had possession of the vehicle or knew its location, since her nephew lived with her. Rawlinson brought a FDCPA claim in response.
The 4th Circuit began by holding that, just as, following Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, PLLC, 443 F.3d 373, 375-76 (4th Cir.
Summary:
Doral agreed in an Interim Servicing Agreement ("ISA") to take over servicing of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") mortgages previously serviced by R&G Mortgage Corp. (R&G). R&G, however, successfully block this assignment. Even though it never actually serviced these mortgages and incurred actual costs of only $124,588.00, Doral then sought 24-months of servicing fees as compensation, as required under the ISA. Freddie Mac argued that Doral was not entitled to such fees, as Freddie Mac had never determin
Summary:
Epps purchased a vehicle from Thompson Toyota subject to a retail sales installment contract ("RIC") that provided, among other things, that it was subject to federal and Maryland law, including the Maryland Closed End Credit Provisions ("CLEC"). The note was later assigned to Chase. When Epps later defaulted, Chase repossessed the vehicle and notified Epps of its intent to sell the vehicle. Contrary to the provisions of CLEC, however, Chase did not notify Epps of the current location of the vehicle or where and when it was to be sold. E
Summary:
The Debtors pledged two properties to Sun Trust as collateral for a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust when recorded, however, was only indexed with the Orange Register of Deeds under the Parcel Identifier Number ("PIN") for Parcel II and not Parcel I. (Orange County, unlike the other 99 counties in North Carolina, which index under a grantor/grantee system based on Deed Book and Page, give every parcel of real property a unique PIN. This PIN is used as the basis for indexing all recorded documents related to that property.)
After the Debtors w
