Summary:

Ms.  Bass signed a promissory note and Deed of Trust with Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc.  ("MLN")  in 2004.  After several purported assignment, Ms.  Bass  default in 2008 on her payments and U.S Bank, as Trustee for Wells Fargo, commenced foreclosure.  After the Clerk of Court allowed the foreclosure to proceed, Ms.  Bass appealed to Superior Court, asserting the U.S. Bank was not the holder of the note.

Summary: After Mr.  Taylor and Ms.  Miller separated, they executed a deed transferring real property to Mr.  Taylor but providing that if Mr.  Taylor later sought to sell the property, Ms.  Miller would have a right of first refusal, allowing her to either match the sales price or pay $41,500.00, plus subsequent costs of repairs and improvements to the property.  In June of 2009, Mr.  Taylor wrote to Ms.  Miller asking her to forego this right of first refusal.  Ms.  Miller did not respond.  Later that month, Mr.  T

Summary: The Debtors granted a Deed of Trust originally to Associates Financial, which was eventually sold or otherwise assigned to Citifinancial.   The Deed of Trust included a legal description of the collateral, but did not include an address.  Debtors later defaulted on a Deed of Trust.  The Substitute Trustee instituted foreclosure proceedings and attempted personal service by Sheriff at three different addresses.  When that failed, the Sheriff posted service at an address that was not for the collateral described in the Deed of Trust.  Unaw

Summary: Coastal Federal Credit Union (CFCU) filed suit against the Debtors in May 2010 for following an alleged default on a retail sales installment contract for the purchase of a vehicle.  On June 18, 2010, after no answer had been filed, CFCU sought an entry of default and default judgment, both of which were allowed by the Clerk of Court  pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1). The Debtors subsequently sought to set aside the default judgment, arguing that they had made payment arrangements with the attorneys for CFCU.  As such, the D

Summary:

In 2004,  Ms.  Willis signed a will, stating that if she conveyed her residence to her son, Eddie, before her death, that it was her wish that if he sold the property, he divide the proceeds with his brother, Anthony.  Subsequently, Ms.  Willis transferred a remainder interest in the the residence to Eddie, but did not include any reversionary interest.  Eddie then died intestate and Ms.  Willis sought to reform the Deed to prevent the property from passing to Eddie’s children, arguing that the Deed to Eddie was a unila

After a very tortured procedural history, the summary of which runs until the tenth page and includes two removal to the federal district court for the EDNC and the involvement in class action cases decided by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA) did not preempt North Carolina law regarding fees charged in connection with a loan, rejecting (as had the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals) the argument that limitations on interest were preempted as the term "interest" cou

Pete Wall Plumbing (PWP) sought to enforce its materialmen's lien against property developed by Sandra Anderson Builders (SAB), in conjuction with Carolina Bank and the Greensboro Housing Authority. Due to the multiparty nature of a development, SAB was both an owner of the properties under Chapter 44A, Article 2, Part 1, by virtue of the Subleases, see N.C. Gen. Stat.

Bobby Stanley, now deceased, borrowed $300,000 from the Plaintiff. Following his death, Yow took responsibility for the debt and the Plaintiff agreed to have the original note marked as satisfied and cancelled. The Court of Appeals held that this was sufficient under N.C. Gen. Stat § 25-3-604 to show the debt was satisfied. Lewis v Stanley.PDF