Summary:
The Debtor’s house was sold at a foreclosure auction for $100,000, with Blue Ridge, the mortgage holder, the highest bidder. Blue Ridge then sold the house at a private sale five months later for $110,000. Blue Ridge subsequently sued the Debtors for the outstanding balance on the note, roughly $30,000. The Debtors argued that Blue Ridge violated N.C.G.S.
Summary:
Capital One commenced a foreclosure against the Debtors on a Deed of Trust, originally granted to Chevy Chase Bank, which later merged with Capital One. The foreclosure was allowed in part based on, among other documents, an Affidavit from James Cox, Vice President of Capital One. This Affidavit stated that "to the best of [his] knowledge" Capital One was the servicer and holder of the mortgage note.
The Debtors objected to this affidavit, arguing that it denoted only Mr. Cox’s personal opinion and was not made upon personal knowledge as required b
Summary:
Citibank brought suit against the Debtor seeking to recover $5,108.89, which it alleged was owed on a credit card, originally issued by AT&T Universal Card in 1995 and acquired by Citibank in 2002. The Debtor disputed the amount owed, alleging that Citibank had changed the interest rate on the credit card without notifying him. Citibank did not respond to the Debtor’s discovery seeking a copy of the original credit card agreement, asserting that the request sough "documents previously provided to ...
Summary:
William Miller, Russell Grogan and Stephanie Grogan purchased a 21.394 acre tract (Tract I) in 1997 and subsequently a 0.15 acre tract (Tract II) to provide access to a road. In 2003, the owners granted a Deed of Trust to GMAC. The Deed of Trust included a tax parcel number that encompassed both Tract I and Tract II, but the legal description only referenced Tract II. In 2005, the owners subdivided Tract I into Tract IA, consisting of 10.932 acres owned by all three, and Tract IB, consisting of 10.389 acres which was henceforth to be owned solely by the Grogan
Ms. Bass signed a promissory note and Deed of Trust with Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. ("MLN") in 2004. After several purported assignment, Ms. Bass default in 2008 on her payments and U.S Bank, as Trustee for Wells Fargo, commenced foreclosure. After the Clerk of Court allowed the foreclosure to proceed, Ms. Bass appealed to Superior Court, asserting the U.S. Bank was not the holder of the note.
Summary:
After Mr. Taylor and Ms. Miller separated, they executed a deed transferring real property to Mr. Taylor but providing that if Mr. Taylor later sought to sell the property, Ms. Miller would have a right of first refusal, allowing her to either match the sales price or pay $41,500.00, plus subsequent costs of repairs and improvements to the property. In June of 2009, Mr. Taylor wrote to Ms. Miller asking her to forego this right of first refusal. Ms. Miller did not respond. Later that month, Mr. T
Summary:
The Debtors granted a Deed of Trust originally to Associates Financial, which was eventually sold or otherwise assigned to Citifinancial. The Deed of Trust included a legal description of the collateral, but did not include an address. Debtors later defaulted on a Deed of Trust. The Substitute Trustee instituted foreclosure proceedings and attempted personal service by Sheriff at three different addresses. When that failed, the Sheriff posted service at an address that was not for the collateral described in the Deed of Trust. Unaw
Summary:
Coastal Federal Credit Union (CFCU) filed suit against the Debtors in May 2010 for following an alleged default on a retail sales installment contract for the purchase of a vehicle. On June 18, 2010, after no answer had been filed, CFCU sought an entry of default and default judgment, both of which were allowed by the Clerk of Court pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1).
The Debtors subsequently sought to set aside the default judgment, arguing that they had made payment arrangements with the attorneys for CFCU. As such, the D
In 2004, Ms. Willis signed a will, stating that if she conveyed her residence to her son, Eddie, before her death, that it was her wish that if he sold the property, he divide the proceeds with his brother, Anthony. Subsequently, Ms. Willis transferred a remainder interest in the the residence to Eddie, but did not include any reversionary interest. Eddie then died intestate and Ms. Willis sought to reform the Deed to prevent the property from passing to Eddie’s children, arguing that the Deed to Eddie was a unila
