After a very tortured procedural history, the summary of which runs until the tenth page and includes two removal to the federal district court for the EDNC and the involvement in class action cases decided by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA) did not preempt North Carolina law regarding fees charged in connection with a loan, rejecting (as had the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals) the argument that limitations on interest were preempted as the term "interest" cou

Pete Wall Plumbing (PWP) sought to enforce its materialmen's lien against property developed by Sandra Anderson Builders (SAB), in conjuction with Carolina Bank and the Greensboro Housing Authority. Due to the multiparty nature of a development, SAB was both an owner of the properties under Chapter 44A, Article 2, Part 1, by virtue of the Subleases, see N.C. Gen. Stat.

In determining if the 60-day wages of the debtor were exempt, the Court determined that the Debtor's fiance and her son were part of his "family". “North Carolina courts understand the word ‘family’ to imply that the debtor has other dependents who rely on the debtor for support.” The use of the word 'dependent' here implies an actual situation of dependency, rather than a potential legal dependency.

A finding that a debt is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.

The Debtor had obtained a series of loans from Creditor, pledging three automobiles as collateral for those loans.

Husband and Wife Debtors were guarantors of a business loan and pledged Deeds of Trust as collateral securing the loans. The Debtors filed Chapter 7 and asserted that by requiring the Wife ot join in the guaranty, the Creditor had violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and the Deed of Trust should be void. Creditor brought a Motion to dismiss arguing that: 1. The Debtors did not have standing under ECOA since as guarantors, they ere not "applicants" under the statute.

The bankruptcy court held that despite the excision in BAPCPA of "substantial" from the abuse provision of 707(b)(3), that the factors laid out by the 4th Circuit in Green v. Staples, 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991) were still good law.

The Debtor was in an automobile accident and had not maintained liability insurance. Judgment was entered in state court for negligence, but after filing Chapter 13 the Plaintiff brought a non-dischargeability action alleging that the failure to maintain liability insurance cause a willful or malicious injury. The Debtor argued that the failure to raise either willfulness or malice in the state court action precluded later raising them in the bankruptcy. Relying on Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 135, 99 S.Ct.

After December 1, 2010, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (c) no longer required that "discharge in bankruptcy" be plead as an affirmative defense because the Rules Committee felt that the language of 11 U.S.C.