Summary: Rudlow, the attorney for WFS, brought a replevin action against Rawlinson and her nephew, for a vehicle which the nephew owned, subject to a lien held by WFS.  Rawlinson was not a party to the note, but Rudlow believed Rawlinson either had possession of the vehicle or knew its location, since her nephew lived with her.  Rawlinson brought a FDCPA claim in response. The 4^th Circuit began by holding that, just as, following Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, PLLC, 443 F.3d 373, 375-76 (4th Cir.

Summary: Doral agreed in an Interim Servicing Agreement ("ISA") to take over servicing of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") mortgages previously serviced by R&G Mortgage Corp.  (R&G).  R&G, however, successfully block this assignment.  Even though it never actually serviced these mortgages and incurred actual costs of only $124,588.00,  Doral then sought 24-months of servicing fees as compensation, as required under the ISA.  Freddie Mac argued that Doral was not entitled to such fees, as Freddie Mac had never determin

Summary: Epps purchased a vehicle from Thompson Toyota subject to a retail sales installment contract ("RIC")  that provided, among other things, that it was subject to federal and Maryland law, including the Maryland Closed End Credit Provisions ("CLEC").  The note was later assigned to Chase.  When Epps later defaulted, Chase repossessed the vehicle and notified Epps of its intent to sell the vehicle.  Contrary to the provisions of CLEC, however, Chase did not notify Epps of the current location of the vehicle or where and when it was to be sold.  E

Summary: The Debtors pledged two properties to Sun Trust as collateral for a Deed of Trust.  The Deed of Trust when recorded, however, was only indexed with the Orange Register of Deeds under the Parcel Identifier Number ("PIN")  for Parcel II and not Parcel I.  (Orange County, unlike the other 99 counties in North Carolina, which index under a grantor/grantee system based on Deed Book and Page, give every parcel of real property a unique PIN.  This PIN is used as the basis for indexing all recorded documents related to that property.) After the Debtors w

Summary: The former officers of EBW Laser, Inc., which has been the subject of a fair bit of litigation in its bankruptcy in the Middle District of North Carolina, brought a complaint against the Chapter 7 Trustee’s law firm and several individual attorneys at the law firm, as well as the accountant for EBW Laser, as they allegedly improperly obtained the officers’ tax return in an attempt to show preferential transfers and/or fraudulent conveyances.  The case was originally brought in state court, but then removed by the Defendants to federal district court, where, foll

Summary: Prior to the filing by Circuit City of a Chapter 11  bankruptcy, Gentry commenced a class action lawsuit against Circuit City, but the class certification was pending at the time the bankruptcy was commenced.  (Three other Named Claimants/Appellants were similarly situated with undecided class certifications.)  The Named Claimants then filed Proof of Claim on behalf of themselves and  "all those similarly situated."  Circuit City and the Trustee objected to these claims on the basis that the Named Claimants had failed to seek authorization fr

Summary: Providence Dane sued Boosahda in state court for $22,000.00 on a credit card debt assigned to Providence Dane from Chase and First USA.  Boosahda counterclaimed for violations of TILA.  After testifying at trial that he did not have any recollection of using or having a Chase or Fist USA credit card, Providence Dane attempted to have a paralegal testify that Providence Dane had obtained  credit card statements showing Boosahda was liable for this debt, but such testimony was excluded as hearsay and the complaint of Providence Dane was dismissed. 

Summary: Ms.  Carson appealed the district court’s order compelling arbitration.  The Court of Appeals held that the first step in determining if a dispute is subject to arbitration is determining whether the parties agreed to arbitration.   Finding that Ms.  Carson "affirmatively checked the box indicating that she agreed" to arbitration, the court then turned to whether such arbitration requirement was unenforceable due to unconscionability.  As Ms.  Carson had willing applied for services from Lending Tree, had indicated that she had read

Summary: Ms.  Strong was denied Social Security disability benefits by an administrative law judge and appealed to the District Court, which remanded the case finding that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence.  The District Court, however, denied Ms.  Strong’s request for attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") at 28 U.S.C.

Summary:

Mrs.  Warren’s husband died, owing a debt on a credit card to BB&T.  Despite the credit card only being in the deceased husband’s name, BB&T, through its attorneys, Sessoms & Rogers, attempted on numerous occasions to collect the debt from Mrs.  Warren.