Summary:
The Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2008. Following a Motion to convert or dismiss the case filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee, the Debtors voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. The U.S. Trustee sought dismissal of the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
Robert and Octavia Jones filed a joint income tax return for the year 2000. After they legally separated, the IRS audited the return and assessed a deficiency, which Robert Jones agreed to discharge through an installment payment plan. When he defaulted, however, the IRS began efforts to collect the deficiency from both Robert and Octavia Jones. More than two years after the IRS first began its collection activities, Octavia Jones requested innocent spouse relief from her tax liability under I.R.C. § 6015(f).
The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of attorneys fees by the District Court, finding that while only nominal actual damages were awarded, attorneys fees were still allowed.
The Court of Appeals held that while Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) and Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005) held that when a Plaintiff "received only nominal damages, 'the only reasonable fee is . . . no fee at all.'â Quotiing Farrar, 506 U.S.
As the FDCPA is concerned âwith the substance of the transaction as opposed to the formâ, the 4th Circuit held that even assuming that the original 2004 debt was a commercial loan, the later 2006 debt, used to satisfy the original obligation, was a consumer loan as it concerned the Plaintiff's personal finances, his personal residence, and was taken out in his own name.
This case may also have value in determining whether a debtor "debts are primarily consumer debts" under 11 U.S.C.
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) places as the 4th priority "allowed unsecured claims, but only to the extent of $10,950 for each individual . . . earned within 180 days before the date of the filing of the petition. . . for (A) wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay earned by an individual." 11 U.S.C.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the Code plainly provides" that a debtor does not have to actually claim an exemption in order to use Code section 522(f) to avoid a judicial lien that impairs the exemption.
Following Smith v. Mixon, 788 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1986), the 4th Circuit ruled that knowledge, for purposes of the good faith defense under § 550(b)(1) to a fraudulent conveyance claim, "does not mean âconstructive notice.â" Nor, however, does this actual notice standard, therefore, require actual knowledge of the transferâs voidability.
